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Available online 18 January 2006The empirical environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) literature is vast but far from conclusive.
Many authors have analysed the existence of an EKC for various pollutants. Others have
used the EKC framework to identify country characteristics that help to explain the income–
environment relationship. In this framework environmental degradation is analysed using
a second or third order polynomial in income and a limited number of control variables.
Some authors question whether this standard framework is appropriate. This paper
proposes an alternative to study the specific characteristics of countries that have
experienced economic growth and an improving environment at the same time. We
estimate a binary responsemodel and find an EKC-like relation between the probability that
a country's environment improves with economic growth and per capita GDP. Our evidence
further suggests that the level of environmental damage is an important explanatory
variable. We also confirm the importance of an open political system. These results indicate
that the binary responsemodel could be a valuable alternative to test which country specific
characteristics are associated with a negative IER.
© 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.Keywords:
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Openness1. Introduction
The environmental Kuznets hypothesis (EKC) predicts an
inverse U-shaped relationship between environmental pollu-
tion on the one hand and per capita income on the other. This
shape is due to the scale-, composition-, income- and
technique effect. At first, the increasing scale of economic
activity as well as its changing composition from agricultural
towards industrial activities generates more pollution. How-
ever, as income rises, demand for environmental quality
increases and governments introduce more stringent envi-
ronmental regulation. This income effect, the replacement of
old technologies by environmentally less harmful ones,
together with the changing composition away from anntal Economics and Envi
2 9 264 35 99.
. Verbeke).
er B.V. All rights reservedindustrial towards a post-industrial economy puts downward
pressure on pollution. Eventually, as income passes some
threshold level, better techniques, an increased demand for
environmental quality and the composition effect outweigh
the scale effect and environmental quality increases with
growth.
The standard empirical EKC literature captures the scale-,
composition-, income- and technique effects through reduced
form regressions (Stern, 1998; de Bruyn et al., 1998) with a
proxy for environmental pollution as dependent variable and
income, income-squared and often income cubed as indepen-
dent variables (e.g. Holtz-Eakin and Selden, 1992; Selden and
Song, 1994; Shafik, 1994; Grossman and Krueger, 1995; Stern
and Common, 2001; Harbaugh et al., 2002).ronmental Management, Ghent University, Hoveniersberg 24, 9000
.
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as it is beyond the scope of this paper. However, as Galeotti
and Lanza (2005) note, a few common features are shared by
most studies on the EKC and are of interest to our paper. The
basic empirical analysis of the EKC starts from an estimate of
(a variation of)
eit ¼ di þ b1yit þ b2y2it þ b3zit þ eit ð1Þ
with eit a proxy for environmental pollution, δi a country
specific effect, yit per capita income, zit a vector of additional
explanatory variables and εit an error term. The subscripts i
refer to a cross-section and the subscript t to time. The EKC
hypothesis requires that β1N0 and β2b0.
The first common feature is related to the functional form.
Themost commonlyused functional form relates ameasure of
environmental pollution to per capita income, per capita
income-squared and often cubed. However, if per capita
income cubed is included in the specification, the analysis
often ignores the estimate. These equations possibly include a
number of extra variables (zit in (1)) to capture alternative non-
income related influences on pollution such as the level of
trade openness (see for instance Suri and Chapman, 1998), a
measure of environmental damage (see for instance Kauf-
mann et al., 1998) or income or political equality as extra
explanatory variables (see for instanceTorras andBoyce, 1998).
Secondly, most of the work uses data in levels in a panel
setting allowing for cross-section specific fixed or random
effects. This implies that Eq. (1) is estimated using time series
data for a number of different cross-sectional units such as
countries, regions or cities.
Thirdly traditional EKC estimates assume homogeneity in
the slope coefficients. In terms of Eq. (1), the estimates of the β-
coefficients are assumed to be identical. Hence, estimates of
Eq. (1) predict that an increase in per capita income will have
the same impact on environmental pollution in each country
or region in the sample.
Fourthly, implicit inmost of thework is the hypothesis that
the causality runs from income to emissions. In other words,
estimates of Eq. (1) assume that emissions do not affect per
capita income.
Some authors question the use of this standard EKC
empirical strategy. They claim that there are a number of
methodological and conceptual problems associated with
each of the four common features of the standard EKC
empirical framework which we have discussed. Although
there are more problems associated with the EKC (see Stern,
1998), we will focus on those related 4 features common to the
standard empirical framework.
Let us first turn to the functional form. The EKC's inverted
U-shaped relationship between emissions and income implies
that at one point in time, environmental pollution will
eventually turn negative. Including income cubed or using
logarithmic dependent variables (Stern, 1998) solves this
problem. However, both solutions can be questioned. Al-
though the third order polynomial in per capita incomewould
only reveal an inverted U-shaped path between emissions and
income if income cubed is insignificant, the evidence seems to
suggest that this is generally not the case. Grossman and
Krueger (1995) for instance find an N-shaped EKC. However,due to the fact that the second income turning point is out of
their sample range, they do not put much emphasis on the
possibility that emissions could increase with income after a
period where the opposite has occurred. Most authors have
followed this practice and largely ignored a significant
estimate for income cubed. However, the presence of a
significant estimate for per capita GDP cubed, i.e. an N-shaped
EKC, implies that emissions will rise indefinitely once the
trough income level is reached. This seems to be at odds with
the EKC-hypothesis. If popular demand is one of the forces
that puts downward pressure on environmental pollution, it
seems to be contradictory to assume that it will not continue
to play its role once income has passed its through level. One
can further question the interpretation of a significant
estimate for income cubed. Moomaw and Unruh (1997) argue
for instance that a significant cubic term in per capita GDP is
the result of data aggregation. If this is the case, a significant
estimate for this cubic term casts doubt on the proper
interpretation of the other income variables.
A second series of critiques involves the use of data in
levels. In the environmental field, the evidence so far seems to
indicate that a lot of environmental time series are non-
stationary time series and are integrated of order 1 (I(1)) or 2 (I
(2)). Stern and Kaufmann (1999) for instance analyse the order
of integration of time series for CO2, SO2, CH4, CFC11, CFC12,
N2O emissions using 4 different tests. Each of their 4 tests
confirm that SO2 emissions are I(1) while 3 out of 4 tests
indicate that CH4 and N2O are integrated of order 1. Their
evidence further suggests one cannot accept the hypothesis
that CO2 is not I(1) as 2 out of 4 tests point in this direction.Lee
and List (2004) show that their US per capita NOx emissions
series for 1900–1994 is I(1). Perman and Stern (2003) perform
both individual and panel unit root tests for SO2 emissions and
per capita GDP for 74 countries using 30 years of data. They
conclude that both these variables are integrated in the
majority of countries. Bertinelli and Strobl (2005) confirm
these results for per capita GDP, sulphur and carbon dioxide
emissions. This suggests that it is not unreasonable to assume
that many environmental series used to test the EKC are I(1).
However, as Nelson and Plosser (1982) found, a lot of economic
time series such as per capita income are also integrated. Lee
and List (2004) argue that most of the studies do not take into
account the time series properties of the data. The use of
variables in level in a panel data setting requires the
assumption that these variables are stationary or, if that is
not the case, that there is a cointegrating relationship among
per capita emissions and the income terms. As argued by
Stern and Common (2001), estimates obtained from reduced
form regressions in levels of pollution and per capita GDP
might be spurious if there is no cointegration relation among
these variables. Perman and Stern's (2003) results provide
evidence that there is no such common cointegrating vector
for SO2 emissions. Furthermore, a Monte Carlo exercise
discussed in Verbeke and De Clercq (in press) suggests that
the standard EKC framework spuriously produces the EKC
results if integrated series are used in over 40% of the cases.
With respect to the second feature, there is a second
argument that questions the use of the standard EKC
framework. Halkos and Tsionas (2001) argue that the use of
OLS to estimate equations such as (1) is inappropriate if two
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They propose a switching regime model and report results for
carbon dioxide and deforestation. Their results cast doubt on
the existence of an EKC. Aslanidis and Xepapadeas (2003, 2004)
also use this approach to model the emission–income
relationship. Their evidence suggests that there are two
regimes and they confirm the EKC hypothesis.
With respect to the assumed homogeneity in the slope
coefficients, there is a lot of evidence that suggests that this
assumption does not hold in practice. List and Gallet (1999) for
instance find awide variety of slope coefficients for their panel
of US states. Hence, OLS estimates will be biased and
inconsistent if the non-homogeneity is not accounted for.
With respect to the fourth common feature of the empirical
work, i.e. that the causality runs from income to emissions,
there has been some evidence that suggests that this does not
need to be the case. Indeed, Coondoo and Dinda (2002)
produce evidence which suggests that for carbon dioxide
emissions, causality might run in the opposite direction.
Furthermore, their work indicates that causality might run
both ways. If that is the case the standard EKC empirical
strategy does not account for simultaneity and produces
biased and inconsistent estimates Stern (1998). However, as
noted in, for instance, List and Gallet (1999) or Lieb (2004)
simultaneity bias does not seem to be an important issue. List
and Gallet (1999) for instance cannot reject the hypothesis that
per capita GDP is exogenous for their dataset with SO2 andNOx
emissions of US states. This problem can be an important one
for other pollutants such as carbon dioxide emissions.
Given these issues, this paper uses an alternative strategy.
In the next section, we propose a binary response model
which we will use in the third section to check for EKC-like
patterns in the income–environment relationship (IER) for
sulphur dioxide emissions (SO2). Furthermore, we use the
model to test the influence of environmental damage, the
level of democracy and openness on the probability that a
country experiences a period of positive economic growth and
improving environmental conditions. The last section
concludes.2. A binary response model to test the IER
The short review in the previous section suggests that it is
worthwhile to investigate a country's IER with an alternative
empirical model that suffers less from the methodological
issues and allows researchers to examine both the IER to test
for an EKC pattern as well as the role of other mechanisms
that shape the IER. We start from the observation that the
slope of the EKC, ∂eit /∂yit, can be positive or strictly negative
(see Eq. (1)). As noted in Aslanidis and Xepapadeas (2003) the
sign of the slope can be associated different ‘states of the
world’ or regimes. If ∂eit /∂yit≥0 economic growth does not
cause an improvement in environmental quality. If, on the
other hand ∂eit /∂yitb0, environmental quality improves with
rising income. The EKC hypothesis implies that the IER
switches regimes in a given country if per capita income
passes some threshold level.
Let Δeit denote the change in environmental pollution in
country i during period t to t+ j and Δyit the change in per capitaincome for country i during the same period t to t+ j. If Δeit /
Δyitb0 country i's economy grew (experienced a recession)
over period t to t+ j as ΔyitN0 (Δyitb0) while pollution dropped
(increased) over the same period: Δeitb0 (ΔeitN0). If that is the
case, one can say that country i's IER was (strictly) negative
from t to t+ j as more (less) economic activity went hand in
hand with less (more) pollution. In our empirical implemen-
tation we have chosen not to include the periods where Δyitb0
and ΔeitN0 because those are likely to introduce ‘a-typical’
observations to our set of negative IER's. It could, for instance,
be possible that during periods of war negative economic
growth is associated with more pollution due to military
activities. If Δeit /Δyit≥0 country i's IER was positive from t to
t+ j. These two states of a country's IER are mutually
exclusive. Hence, we can define the binary variables Iit as
Iit ¼ 1fDeitb0 and DyitN00 otherwise :

ð2Þ
If Iit=1 country i's IER was (strictly) negative from t to t+ j. If
Iit=0 its IER was positive over that time period or the period
was considered a-typical.
We can model the probability that we find that environ-
mental pollution is decreasing as income grows, by the binary
response model
Pr½Iit ¼ 1jxit ¼ f ðxitbÞ ð3Þ
where f is a distribution function, xit is a matrix of the
independent variables for country i and period t and β is a
vector of parameters to be estimated. A test of the EKC
requires that the independent variables include both yit and yit2.
Furthermore, the estimates of the parameters associated with
these per capita income variables should suggest that Pr[Iit=1|
xit] decreases at early stages of economic development and
increases after per capita income surpasses some threshold. If
the estimates fail to allow that conclusion, it would be hard to
argue that the IER follows and EKC-type of path.
As noted in Estrella and Mishkin (1997) the construction of
a binary variable implies that one abstracts from the
magnitude of the change in the dependent variable caused
by a change in one of the independent variables and one
focuses on a simple binary indicator. Instead of focussing on
‘how much’ emissions decrease as income grows, a binary
indicator analyses ‘if’ that has been the case. Although one
can argue that thesemodels are less precise as they are unable
to determine the actual magnitude, they are less demanding
which may increase their potential accuracy (Estrella and
Mishkin, 1997).
The fact that they are less demanding offers some
perspective in terms of the critiques on the standard empirical
EKC framework. Indeed, the binary response approach seems
to suffer less from the criticisms discussed in the Introduction.
First of all, a binary response approach ismore flexible with
respect to the shape IER. Even if we include per capita income
and its square in the model as independent variables, it does
not force an inverted U- or N-shaped IER. Assume that the
estimates are such that model would predict that the
probability of a negative IER decreases for low levels of per
capita income and increases after income reaches a threshold.
With the exception of those countries for which the estimates
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will be negative for each and every period for which per capita
income is higher than the threshold. As a matter of fact, the
model explicitly allows for periods characterized by a negative
IER to be followed by a period with a positive one. It seems to
be important to allow for such a possibility. Assume for
instance that demand for a better environmental quality
depends on both income as well as the level of environmental
damage (see Kaufmann et al., 1998 for a discussion). The
disutility caused by pollution does not only depend on the
level of income, but also on the level of damage to the
environment due to pollution. Assume also that government
policy is introduced or changed at specific, discrete points in
time when the public is concerned enough about the damages
and demands government intervention (see the model by
Smulders and Bretschger, 2001). Thirdly, assume that govern-
ment policy has only a transitory effect on pollution. As noted
by Lee and List (2004) this implies that government interven-
tion does not have an influence on long run pollution trends.
Government policy causes a downward shift in the level of
pollution but the growth rate will revert to its mean. With
these assumptions, it is easy to sketch a scenario where the
slope of the IER alternates between negative and positive. If
the level of damage caused by environmental pollution is
sufficiently high, popular demand for a better environmental
quality causes government intervention. In the period follow-
ing the intervention, pollution drops as economic agents
adapt their behaviour to the new legislation. If, over that same
period per capita income has grown, the IER was negative.
However, as the effect of the intervention is only transitory,
pollution growth rates return to their long run path and if per
capita income continues to grow, the IER will be positive.
Obviously, at one point in time, environmental pollution will
return to a level where it causes a sufficient amount of damage
and governments are again required to intervene. A binary
choice model allows for such behaviour, whereas the tradi-
tional inverted-U of N shaped EKC does not.
A binary response model does not suffer from the
methodological issues related to the time series properties of
the data as the dependent variable is a binary indicator.
A third series of critiques concerned the assumed homo-
geneity of the slope of an EKC-type of IER: an increase in per
capita income causes the same drop in per capita emissions in
every country or region included in the analysis. A binary
response model is less demanding in that respect. First of all,
the construction of the binary indicator Iit does not include a
criterion which includes the size of the change in environ-
mental pollution. Furthermore, from (3) it can be seen that a
change in per capita income does not have to have an equal
impact on Pr[Iit=1|xit] as
APr½Iit ¼ 1jxit
Ayit
¼ Af ðxitbÞ
Axitb
Axitb
Ayit
: ð4Þ
With the exception of the linear probability model, the impact
of a change in yit depends on the values of the other
independent variables.
With respect to the causality, we can construct the binary
indicator in such a way that the results do not suffer from
simultaneity biases. More specifically, in our implementation
of the approach, explanatory variables always refer to periodsprior to the binary variable indicating if the IERwas negative or
positive.
Although the model has some advantages, there are some
disadvantages as well. The first one concerns the ability to
calculate the level of environmental pollution at the peak. We
have already referred to the fact that a binary response
approach abstracts from the magnitude of a variable. Hence,
from its results, it is impossible to conclude whether this peak
level causes irreversible harm or not. As Arrow et al. (1995)
have pointed out, if pollution at the peak cause irreversible
harm, there will be no level of income that can correct for the
harm done to the environment.
Secondly, a binary responsemodel is binary and it does not
allow distinguishing between those observations that point to
a ‘very negative’ IER, a ‘moderately negative’ IER and a
‘somewhat negative’ IER. Although a multinomial approach
could come to the rescue, it does require the researcher to
determine the boundaries between ‘very’, ‘moderately’ and
‘somewhat’.
We have already pointed out that the binary response
approach offers some evidence with respect to the question if
a country's IER follows and EKC-type of path. The evidence is
indirect as the estimates cannot confirm an EKC-type of IER.
However, it could provide evidence against the EKC. If Iit=1,
the environment improves with economic growth. The
estimates of the binary response model would offer evidence
against the EKC if there is no level of income below which
economic growth is associated with a lower probability of a
negative IER and above which it is associated with a higher
probability of a negative IER.3. Empirical model and data
Implementing a binary response approach requires 3 deci-
sions. First, we need to define Iit, i.e. determine when Δeitb0
and ΔyitN0. Secondly we have to specify f. Thirdly we have to
determine which variables to include in xit.
With respect to the first choice, we have used data for SO2
emissions as our measure of environmental pollution. We
used this pollutant for two reasons. First of all, it is a pollutant
that has been widely used in empirical EKC literature.
Secondly, SO2 data is available for a large number of countries
as well as years. SO2 emissions are from A.S.L. and Associates
(Lefohn et al., 1999). As is usual in the EKC literature,
population is used to normalize emissions. Population data
was taken from the Penn World Tables (Mark 5.6a, Summers
and Heston, 1994).
We have used the 2 rules to establish if a country's
environment improves with higher levels of income, i.e. if
Iit=1 We have tried to keep them as simple albeit as realistic
and close to the EKC as possible. Our first rule uses per capita
emissions andper capitaGDP for 5-yearperiods.As a base year,
we use t=1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980 and 1985. For country i
and base year t Iit=1 if 3 conditions are simultaneously met. In
the 5-year period following the base year (1) per capita GDP
must have increased (i.e. yit+5Nyit+1), (2) per capita emissions
must have fallen eit+5beit+1 and (3) we require that total
emissions (E) in the first year of the 5-year period are lower
than total emissions in the last year, i.e. Eit+5bEit+1.
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periods 1961–1965, 1966–1970, 1971–1975, 1976–1980, 1981–
1985 and 1986–1990 to avoid the problem of autocorrelation.
We respect the choice of the 5-year period, we have done so
to acknowledge the fact that the process of policy formulation
and implementation takes time. As noted in Lieb (2004) if
environmental policy is one of the driving forces behind the
IER, one has to take into account the fact that regulations have
to be drafted, voted and implemented. Hence there is a time
lag between the conditions in the base year and the actual
impact on emissions. The use of 5-year periods accounts for
this lag. Obviously, the use of 5-year periods is somewhat
arbitrary. To test the robustness of our results for the choice of
the timeframe, we checked with an alternative indicator
which uses 10-year periods for the base years t=1960, 1970
and 1980 and 10-year intervals 1961–1970, 1971–1980 and
1981–1990. The requirements with respect to per capita
income, per capita emissions and total emissions are similar
and defined over 10-year periods. We will refer to the ‘10-year
rule’ if we use data based on these 10-year periods and to the
‘5-year rule’ if we use data based on the 5-year periods.
We have chosen to use only the base years to estimate the
binary responsemodel. This leaves 440 observations for the 5-
year rule and 220 observations for the 10-year rule.
Table 1 summarizes these rules.
From Table 1, it can be seen that we have 23% out of a total
of 440 5-year periods where countries are experiencing
improved environmental quality as well as economic growth.
The 10-year rule reveals 21% negative slopes out of a total of
220 observations. Observations with a negative IER do not all
come from ‘rich’ countries although the majority of them do.
For OECD members for instance, 36% out of a total of 138
observations show a negative IER. The relative number of
negative IER's differs somewhat between the two rules.
However, they seem to be comparable.
With respect to f in (3) we have chosen to use 2 alternatives
which allow us to test our results for the robustness of our
choice of f. The first one is the cumulative logistic distribution
function. With country specific fixed effects, this yields the
fixed effects logit model:
Pr Iit ¼ 1jxit; ai½  ¼
expðxitbþ aiÞ
1þ expðxitbþ aiÞ
ð5Þ
where αi is the country specific fixed effect. Eq. (5) is estimated
using the conditional maximum likelihood method (Maddala,Table 1 – Total number of observations and negative IERa
5-year rule 10-year rule
Obs. Neg. IER (%) Obs. Neg. IER (%)
Total 440 23 220 21
Western Europe 114 40 57 36
Eastern Europe 24 8 12 8
North America 48 15 24 13
South America 48 13 24 13
Africa 90 19 45 18
Asia 104 20 52 17
Oceania 12 33 6 33
OECD 138 36 69 33
a Obs. refers to the total number of observations. Neg. IER refers
to those observations for which the IER is negative.1987). The country specific constants are not reported. We
have used the conditional logistic regression (xtlogit) com-
mand in STATA.
A major drawback from the conditional maximum likeli-
hood logistic regression is that only countries for which Iit
actually switches are included in the estimation. In our
analysis, this means that countries who have never experi-
enced a downward sloping IER or who have always been on its
downward sloping path are excluded from the estimation. A
random effects specification does not suffer from this
drawback. However, as noted in Maddala (1987) a major
disadvantage of the multivariate logistic distribution is that
is restricts all correlations to 1/2. As the error term in random
effects estimates is correlated across cross-sections, the
multivariate logistic distribution does not allow much flexi-
bility. The probit model is much more flexible in that respect
which is whywe also estimated a random effects probit model
Pr½Iit ¼ 1jxit; vi ¼ Uðxitbþ viÞ ð6Þ
where vi are iid N (0, σv2) country specific random effects and Φ
is the cumulative normal distribution. However, the random
effects model assumes that xit and vi are uncorrelated. This
might be a strong assumption. We use STATA's xtprobit
command to estimate the random effects probit model.
EKC literature inspired the explanatory variables that are
included in xit: the log of per capita income and its square,
environmental damage (Kaufmann et al., 1998), an indicator of
political equality (see Torras and Boyce, 1998; Magnani, 2000;
Ravallion et al., 2000) and an indicator of openness to
international trade. We have added environmental damage
because standard EKC models could be misspecified in the
absence of such an indicator. Indeed, as Kaufmann et al. (1998)
for instance suggest, the marginal benefit of an improved
environment is an important variable that ismissing in a lot of
the work on the EKC. Assuming that marginal benefits of less
pollution are higher if the concentration of an environmental
pollutant is higher; they include ameasure of benefits of better
environmental quality and find that the inverted U-shape
between pollution and per capita income disappears. From
their evidence, these authors conclude that income as such is
not sufficient to explain the downward sloping part of the EKC
and ameasure of benefits should be included. Stern (2005) also
suggests that countries with higher levels of emissions per
unit area could be more aggressive in adopting pollution
abating technologies. We measure environmental damage as
the log of the size of a country (measured in square kilometres)
per ton of SO2 emissions. Area data are from the World
Development Indicators (World Bank). This measure assumes
that damage from emissions will be higher if these emissions
are located in a smaller area. A major drawback of this
definition of concentration is the fact that sulphur emissions
are internationally mobile and measured concentrations in
one country might be different from the concentrations as
calculated here. This is especially the case with respect to
sulphur dioxide, which is a non-uniformly mixing pollutant
(see Folmer and de Zeeuw, 2000). Secondly, as an indicator of
environmental harm, emissions do not take into account the
capacity of the natural environment to absorb them. The
number of square kilometres a ton of SO2 has to spread may
thus not fully reflect environmental damage. This could be
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sulphur dioxide emissions is highly skewed or if the capacity
of the environment is significantly different from the capacity
in other countries. However, data onmeasured concentrations
is only available for a subset of our observations.
Heerink et al. (2001) have shown that the degree of income
or power inequality should be added due to the fact that
standard EKC regressions are based on aggregated concave
individual EKC's. Harbaugh et al. (2002) include a democracy
index in their EKC regressions and find that it has a negative
effect on pollution. Political equality data are from the Polity IV
dataset (Marshall and Jaggers, 2000). The major advantage of
this dataset is its level of detail and the large coverage in terms
of time and geographic scope. To construct the polity variable,
the authors use indicators of democracy and autocracy and
authority characteristics. These indicators measure issues
such as the extent to which the executive or legislative branch
of government is open to political parties. With these
characteristics, they construct the variable POLITY as a
measure of the equality of a political system on a scale from
−10 (closed, autocratic political systems) to +10 (open,
democratic political systems).
Openness of the economy is calculated as the sum of
exports and imports in percent of GDP. Both per capita GDP in
1985 constant USD as well as openness are from the Penn
World tables (mark 5.6a, Summers and Heston, 1994).
Table 2 summarizes our data for each rule.
Explanatory variables always refer to the first year prior
to the year for which the binary indicator was calculated. If
Δeit=eit+j−eit+1 then all explanatory variables included in xit
are measured in t.
For each IER-rule and model we have estimated 5
specifications. With 5 specifications we can test the robust-
ness of our results for each model and rule. The various
specifications are variants of:
Pr½Iit ¼ 1 ¼ f ðdi þ b1yit þ b2y2it þ b3Dit þ b4Pit þ b5DitPit
þ b6yitPit þ b7OitÞ ð7Þ
where δi=αi in the fixed effects logit model and δi=vi in the
random effects probit model, yit is the log of per capita GDP, Dit
is environmental damage, Pit is our polity variable and Oit is
openness of the economy. The first specification uses only the
per capita income terms and restricts the coefficientsTable 2 – Explanatory variables
Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max.
5-year rule
Per capita GDP 440.00 3,108 2.61 316 20,018
Concentrationa 444.00 3,582 10.97 3.11 29,453,108
Polity 405.00 1.35 7.92 −10.00 10.00
Openness 440.00 57.95 46.19 5.00 423.41
10-year rule
Per capita GDP 220.00 2,945 2.61 316 20,018
Concentrationa 222.00 3,818 11.20 3.11 29,453,108
Polity 198.00 1.51 7.89 −10.00 10.00
Openness 220.00 57.93 48.46 5.00 423.41
a The large value for the maximum for the variable concentra-
tions refers to Tanzania which has very little SO2 emissions.β3=β4=β5=β6=β7=0. The second specification adds Dit and
restricts β4=β5=β6=β7=0. The third specification adds Pit and
imposes β5=β6=β7=0. However, as this variable was almost
never significant, we introduced a fourth specification which
drops Pit but adds, following Magnani (2000), the interaction
terms in polity and concentrations (Pit *Dit) and polity and
income (Pit *yit). This specification implies that β4=β7=0. We
have introduced these interaction terms as a way to capture
the notion that a higher popular demand for a better
environment for instance because of the income-effect will
have a different impact on environmental policies in
democracies.
The fifth specification adds Oit to the fourth one and only
β4=0.4. Results
Table 3 reports the results of the fixed effects logit model for
the 5-year rule. Table 4 presents the results for the 5-year rule
random effects probit model. The results for the 10-year rule
are available in Tables A1 (fixed effects logit) and A2 (random
effects probit) in Appendix A. All tables include the number of
observations (N. Obs.) and the number of groups (N. Groups)
that were used, the log likelihood of the model (Log
Likelihood), the log likelihood of a model which includes
only a constant (Log likelihood c.o.) and 2 measures of fit. The
first one, χ2-statistic is ameasure of the joint significance of all
variables in the model. The second one, the Pseudo-R2 is
calculated as (see Estrella, 1998)
Pseudo−R2 ¼ 1− LðbˆÞ
Lðb˜Þ
 − 2nð ÞL b˜ð Þ
ð8Þ
where L(βˆ ) is the log likelihood of the estimatedmodel and L(β˜ )
is the log likelihood of the constant only model. To save some
space, we do not report the constant from the random effects
probit models. All constants were positive and significant at
the 5% or 1% level of significance.
The results are similar across IER rules. With respect to per
capita GDP the estimates reveal a U-shaped relation between
per capita income and the probability of a negative IER. The
marginal effect of a change in the log of per capita income on
the probability that a country is experiencing improving
environmental conditions as well as economic growth equals,
for the fixed effects logit model
APr½Iit ¼ 1jxit; ai
Ayit
¼ expðxitbþ aiÞ
ð1þ expðxitbþ aiÞÞ2
b1 þ 2b2yit þ b6Pitð Þ ð9Þ
and
APr½Iit ¼ 1jxit;vi
Ayit
¼ U xitbþ við Þ b1 þ 2b2yit þ b6Pitð Þ ð10Þ
for the random effects probit model.
Eqs. (9) and (10) are positive for specifications 1–3 if β1+
2β2yitN0. If β1b0 and β2N0 it follows that themarginal impact of
an increase in per capita GDP will be positive if yitN−
b1
2b2
. If per
capita income exceeds this threshold, the probability of a
negative IER increases with income. As long as per capita
incomes are smaller, the probability of a negative IER falls as
Table 3 – Estimates of the fixed effects logit model for the 5-year rule a
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Per capita GDP −8.7197 [4.8114]* −13.455 [5.4264]** −17.6345 [6.0329]*** −15.8511 [6.2111]** −15.8404 [6.2137]**
Per capita GDP sq. 0.5932 [0.2918]** 0.8568 [0.3268]*** 1.1045 [0.3609]*** 0.9846 [0.3730]*** 0.978 [0.3739]***
Concentration −1.0044 [0.3021]*** −1.6211 [0.4307]*** −1.7994 [0.4501]*** −1.7908 [0.4503]***
Polity 0.0373 [0.0489]
Concentration*Polity −0.0509 [0.0224]** −0.0508 [0.0224]**
Per capita GDP*Polity 0.068 [0.0292]** 0.0679 [0.0291]**
Openness 0.003 [0.0118]
N. Obs. 294 294 265 265 265
N. Groups 49 49 46 46 46
Log likelihood −115 −106.62 −88.99 −85.91 −85.87
Log likelihood c.o. −120.05 −120.05 −108.94 −108.94 −108.94
χ2 10.1*** 26.86*** 39.9*** 46.08*** 46.14***
Pseudo-R2 0.0345 0.0923 0.1532 0.1774 0.1777
Income turning pointb 1556 2571 2931 3132 3289
Polity=+10 2218 2324
Polity=−10 4424 4654
a Dependent variable is the probability that the IER is negative over a 5-year period. Column headings refer to the specification. Standard errors
are reported between brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
b Income turning points are in 1985 USD.
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evidence would be favourable to the notion that higher
incomes are associated with a higher probability of improving
environmental conditions. Columns (1)–(3) of Table 3 report
the results for specifications 1–3 of the fixed effects logit
model using the 5-year rule. The estimates suggest that the
probability of a negative IER increases for income levels larger
than 1985 USD 1556 to 1985 USD 2931. Similar levels hold
across rules. These income levels are within the sample range
(see Table 2). These estimates are on the low end of previously
reported results (see Table 2.1 in Lieb, 2004), Grossman and
Krueger (1995), Panayotou (2000) or Torras and Boyce (1998)
have found similar levels for SO2.
The results for specifications 4–5, with the exception of
those for the fixed effects logit estimates using the 10-year
rule reported in Table A1, provide evidence that suggests that
income turning points differ with the level of politicalTable 4 – Estimates of the random effects probit model for the 5
(1) (2)
Per capita GDP −3.9779 [1.3700]*** −4.1334 [1.4023]***
Per capita GDP sq. 0.2706 [0.0860]*** 0.2775 [0.0876]***
Concentration −0.0344 [0.0430]
Polity
Concentration*Polity
Per capita GDP*Polity
Openness
N. Obs. 440 440
N. Groups 74 74
Log likelihood −221.81 −221.48
Log likelihood c.o. −234.4 −234.4
χ2 25.17*** 25.83***
Pseudo-R2 0.0571 0.0586
Income turning pointb 1556 1716
Polity=+10
Polity=−10
a Dependent variable is the probability that the IER is negative over a 5-y
are reported between brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%,
b Income turning points are in 1985 USD.openness. Columns (4)–(5) (in Tables 3, 4 and A2) show that
the coefficient β6 for the interaction term in per capita GDP and
polity is negative and significant. From Eqs. (9) and (10), one
can see that this implies that the probability of a negative IER
increases if the log of per capita income is higher than
−
ðb1 þ b6PitÞ
2b2
. The bottom 2 rows of (Tables 3, 4 and A2) show the
threshold level of income in two extreme political equality
cases. If polity=10, which indicates that a country is charac-
terized by very open and democratic political structures, the
probability that a country's IER is negative increases with per
capita income if the latter is higher than 1985 USD 1485
(column (4) of Table 4) to 1985 USD 3267 (column (4) of Table
A2). If, on the other hand, countries are politically closed and
autocratic (polity=−10) this threshold roughly doubles.
These estimates suggest that the probability that a
country's IER is negative follows an EKC-type of transition.
At low levels of per capita GDP, an increase in income is-year rule a
(3) (4) (5)
−4.86 [1.4523]*** −3.5156 [1.4714]** −3.1855 [1.3092]**
0.319 [0.0913]*** 0.232 [0.0931]** 0.21 [0.0828]**
−0.0311 [0.0440] −0.0313 [0.0426] −0.0043 [0.0396]
0.0167 [0.0129]
−0.0107 [0.0042]*** −0.0108 [0.0038]***
0.0127 [0.0044]*** 0.0129 [0.0041]***
0.0025 [0.0017]
402 402 402
71 71 71
−198.5 −195 −194.29
−215.06 −215.06 −215.06
33.1*** 40.11*** 41.54***
0.0822 0.0995 0.1030
2034 1952 1968
1485 1447
2567 2675
ear period. Column headings refer to the specification. Standard errors
5% and 10% level.
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environment improves with economic growth. However, once
per capita GDP reaches an income level equal to the reported
turning points, this probability increases with per capita GDP.
The thresholds are affected by the political openness of a
country. This suggests that demand for a better environment
is translated into environmental policy action sooner, i.e. at
lower levels of per capita income, in politically open demo-
cratic countries. Hence, countries whose income level is equal
could experience different probabilities of a negative IER if
their political systems are unequal. These results are in line
with those obtained by Magnani (2000) who found that net
effect of equality on her dependent variable (environmental
expenditures) was positive. However, contrary to her results or
those obtained by Harbaugh et al. (2002) we do not find
evidence that suggests that the level of (political) equality is
significant. Estimating specifications 4–5 including Pit does not
result in a significant estimate for this variable.
The evidence supports the hypothesis that the level of
environmental damage matters. The estimates of the terms
involving our measure of concentration of the fixed effects
logit model with the 5-year rule are all highly significant
and negative. Estimates of the 10-year rule reveal that only
the level of concentration is significant. For both random
effects probit models, the level of concentration is never
significant but the interaction terms are. This seems to
suggest that higher levels of concentration predict a higher
probability of a negative IER. For both 5-year rules and the
random effects probit 10-year estimates, the impact of the
level of concentration increases as a country is politically
more open. These results could be seen as a reassertion of
those obtained by Kaufmann et al. (1998), who found that
the level of environmental damage plays a significant role in
explaining the income–environment relationship. Our esti-
mates suggest, with the exception of those for the 10-year
rule fixed effects logit model, that demand for a better
environment, due to a high level of environmental damage,
is translated sooner into intervention in politically open and
democratic societies.
Whether a country is politically open or not does, in itself,
not have an impact on the probability of a downward sloping
IER. Although the coefficient for the polity variable reported
in column (3) in Tables 3, 4, A1 and A2 has the expected sign,
it is hardly significant. With the exception of our estimates
for the 10-year rule random effects probit model, the
coefficient for Pit is never significant and even when it is, it
is only so at the 10% level. Both EKC-rules offer the same
result. However, as already discussed, when interacted with
per capita income as well as with the level of concentrations,
the polity variable has a significant impact for both models
with the 5-year rule and for the random effects probit model
with the 10-year rule. From these estimates, it follows that
the political openness of a country is important as a way to
translate popular demand for a better environment into
policy intervention. The estimates suggest that one needs
both for the probability of a negative IER to be affected. A
democratic government in a country whose environment is
extremely clean does not have to introduce legislation. Our
estimates suggest that the probability that it will do so is
indeed limited.Economic openness is only significant and positive for the
10-year rules. Both 5-year models reveal positive but insignif-
icant estimates. The estimates for the 5-year rule are contrary
to those obtained by, for instance, Harbaugh et al. (2002) or
Cole (2004) whose evidence suggests that trade intensity is
negatively associated with pollution. However, the estimates
for the 10-year rule are positive and suggest that, at least over
a 10-year period, that trade openness is positively associated
with the probability of a negative IER. The probability of a
negative IER over a 10-year time frame is higher in those
countries that are more open to international trade.5. Final conclusions
This paper uses a binary response model to analyse the
probability that a particular country's IER is negative, i.e.
that it has experienced a period within which environmental
quality has improved with economic growth. The analysis
suggests that it is an approach that might be worth
exploring further. A binary response approach is less
demanding compared to the traditional cross-section time
series approach used in most of the EKC literature. Hence, it
seems to offer a methodology that is able to serve as an
alternative that suffers less from the critiques on the
traditional approach. The evidence in this paper suggests
that a binary response approach might be a good alternative
to explore the characteristics of countries that have been
developing along the downward sloping part of an EKC. In
our implementation of the model, our estimates reveal an
EKC-like relation between the probability that a country is
experiencing better environmental quality and per capita
GDP. The income turning points, although on the low end of
previously reported results, are within the sample range. Our
results show that controlling for environmental damage is
important as the probability of a negative IER increases with
the level of environmental damage. Our evidence further
suggests that the impact of per capita income or the level of
concentration is affected by the openness of the political
structures in a country. For a given level of per capita
income or concentration a more politically open country has
a higher probability of experiencing a negative IER. This
binary response model has disadvantages as well. First of all,
it does not allow us to assess the irreversibility of
environmental pollution at its peak. This shows that a
binary response approach should not be seen as a substitute
for other methodologies based on reduced form regressions.
A second disadvantage of a binary response approach
concerns the binary nature of the approach. A country is
either developing along the downward sloping part or it is
not. A binary response approach does not differentiate
between countries whose slope is steep and those whose
slope is down but rather flat. A multinomial approach might
offer an alternative that allows us to distinguish between
various ‘levels of steepness’ of the EKC.
However, a binary responsemodel might be a valuable tool
to gain a better understanding of the characteristics of those
countries that have actually experienced periods where
economic growth was not associated with higher levels of
environmental pollution.
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suggestions. Any remaining errors are exclusively ours.Appendix ATable A1 – Estimates for the fixed effects logit model for the 10-year rule a
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Per capita GDP −17.2146 [7.3639]** −51.9112 [16.4457]*** −43.1936 [15.5772]*** −38.5127 [17.8910]** −50.0105 [22.1075]**
Per capita GDP sq. 1.1141 [0.4473]** 3.124 [0.9906]*** 2.6505 [0.9368]*** 2.3685 [1.0767]** 2.8428 [1.2858]**
Concentration −4.995 [1.6634]*** −4.0669 [1.5582]*** −3.9783 [1.5148]*** −4.4289 [1.6716]***
Polity 0.1458 [0.1770]
Concentration*Polity −0.0333 [0.0930] −0.049 [0.0984]
Per capita GDP*Polity 0.0563 [0.1131] 0.0696 [0.1170]
Openness 0.0935 [0.0533]*
N. Obs. 105 105 90 90 90
N. Groups 35 35 31 31 31
Log likelihood −33.1 −16.43 −14.48 −14.43 −12.55
Log likelihood c.o. −38.45 −38.45 −32.84 −32.84 −32.84
χ2 10.71*** 44.03*** 36.73*** 36.82*** 40.59***
Pseudo-R2 0.1039 0.4635 0.4499 0.4513 0.5044
Income turning pointb 2266 4058 3457 3395 6608
Polity=+10 n.s. c n.s. c
Polity=−10 n.s. c n.s. c
a Dependent variable is the probability that the IER is negative over a 10-year period. Column headings refer to the specification. Standard
errors are reported between brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
b Income turning points are in 1985 USD.
c Estimate of the interaction terms in per capita GDP and Polity is not significant.
Table A2 – Estimates from the random effects probit model for the 10-year rule a
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Per capita GDP −6.0013 [1.5666]*** −6.3155 [1.5918]*** −7.7056 [1.8110]*** −6.6682 [1.8757]*** −6.7837 [1.8989]***
Per capita GDP sq. 0.3953 [0.0990]*** 0.4085 [0.1001]*** 0.4864 [0.1136]*** 0.4186 [0.1189]*** 0.4251 [0.1202]***
Concentration −0.0779 [0.0503] −0.0818 [0.0567] −0.077 [0.0572] −0.0356 [0.0614]
Polity 0.0335 [0.0176]*
Concentration*Polity −0.0106 [0.0056]* −0.0114 [0.0056]**
Per capita GDP*Polity 0.0145 [0.0059]** 0.0158 [0.0060]***
Openness 0.0045 [0.0023]*
N. Obs. 220 220 197 197 197
N. Groups 74 74 71 71 71
Log likelihood −102.69 −101.48 −86.51 −84.42 −82.48
Log likelihood c.o. −113.84 −113.84 −103.01 −103.01 −103.01
χ2 22.3*** 24.73*** 33*** 37.18*** 41.05***
Pseudo-R2 0.1012 0.1121 0.1669 0.1879 0.2074
Income turning pointb 1980 2276 2755 2878 2919
Polity=+10 3267 3338
Polity=−10 2536 2553
a Dependent variable is the probability that the IER is negative over a 10-year period. Column headings refer to the specification. Standard
errors are reported between brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
b Income turning points are in 1985 USD.
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